Strategies at points of entry to reduce importation risk of COVID-19 cases and reopen travel.

BACKGROUND: With more countries exiting lockdown, public health safety requires screening measures at international travel entry points that can prevent the reintroduction or importation of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-2. Here, we estimate the number of cases captured, quarantining days averted and secondary cases expected to occur with screening interventions. METHODS: To estimate active case exportation risk from 153 countries with recorded coronavirus disease-2019 cases and deaths, we created a simple data-driven framework to calculate the number of infectious and upcoming infectious individuals out of 100 000 000 potential travellers from each country, and assessed six importation risk reduction strategies; Strategy 1 (S1) has no screening on entry, S2 tests all travellers and isolates test-positives where those who test negative at 7 days are permitted entry, S3 the equivalent but for a 14 day period, S4 quarantines all travellers for 7 days where all are subsequently permitted entry, S5 the equivalent for 14 days and S6 the testing of all travellers and prevention of entry for those who test positive. RESULTS: The average reduction in case importation across countries relative to S1 is 90.2% for S2, 91.7% for S3, 55.4% for S4, 91.2% for S5 and 77.2% for S6. An average of 79.6% of infected travellers are infectious upon arrival. For the top 100 exporting countries, an 88.2% average reduction in secondary cases is expected through S2 with the 7-day isolation of test-positives, increasing to 92.1% for S3 for 14-day isolation. A substantially smaller reduction of 30.0% is expected for 7-day all traveller quarantining, increasing to 84.3% for 14-day all traveller quarantining. CONCLUSIONS: The testing and isolation of test-positives should be implemented provided good testing practices are in place. If testing is not feasible, quarantining for a minimum of 14 days is recommended with strict adherence measures in place.

Development of a competency profile for professionals involved in infectious disease preparedness and response in the air transport public health sector.

BACKGROUND: Recent infectious disease outbreaks highlight the importance of competent professionals with expertise on public health preparedness and response at airports. The availability of a competency profile for this workforce supports efficient education and training. Although competency profiles for infectious disease control professionals are available, none addresses the complex airport environment. Therefore, the main aim of this study is to develop a competency profile for professionals involved in infectious disease preparedness and response at airports in order to stimulate and direct further education and training. METHODS: We developed the competency profile through the following steps: 1) extraction of competencies from relevant literature, 2) assessment of the profile in a national RAND modified Delphi study with an interdisciplinary expert group (n = 9) and 3) assessment of the profile in an international RAND modified Delphi study with an airport infectious disease management panel of ten European countries (n = 10). RESULTS: We systematically studied two competency profiles on infectious disease control and three air transport guidelines on event management, and extracted 61 relevant competencies for airports. The two RAND modified Delphi procedures further refined the profile, mainly by specifying a competency's target group, the organizational level it should be present on, and the exact actions that should be mastered. The final profile, consisting of 59 competencies, covers the whole process from infectious disease preparedness, through the response phase and the recovery at airports. CONCLUSION: We designed a profile to support training and exercising the multidisciplinary group of professionals in infectious disease management in the airport setting, and which is ready for use in practice. The many adaptations and adjustments that were needed to develop this profile out of existing profiles and air transport guidelines suggest that other setting-specific profiles in infectious disease control are desirable.

[COP21 - Organization and activity of a medical cover under "pressure"]. / COP21 ­ Organisation et bilan d'une médicalisation sous haute tension.

INTRODUCTION: The United Nations Climate Conference (COP21) gathered in France for delegations from all around the world, with 20,000 delegates from 195 countries every day, including 150 heads of states during the first 48hours. A specific medical cover was organized in a particular "post-attacks" context and with harsh constraints due to delimitation of an inner zone under the sole UN authority ("blue zone"). OBJECTIVE: To evaluate medical means involved and medical activity. METHODS: Medical cover was managed by SAMU 93 in collaboration with zonal SAMU and regional health agency for the entire site including the "blue zone". End-points: engaged workforce, number of visits, including transfers and medicalized transfers. RESULTS: In "France zone" (operational headquarters): an emergency physician dispatcher and an assistant for 20 days. In "blue zone": 20 rescuers, mobile intensive care unit H24 and two emergency physicians (consultations) 12/24hours for 16 days. A total of 47 doctors, 25 nurses, 25 paramedics and 20 assistants participated in the medical service. This corresponded to three emergency physician full medical time equivalents (FMTE) for 16 days. Consultations performed: 1238 or 97/day resulting in 34 (3%) transfers including seven medicalized. Patients were 706 (57%) men and 495 (43%) women, with mean age of 43±1 years. Trauma patients were most numerous (20%). CONCLUSION: Medical means involved were consistent for 16 days. The medical activity was sustained, but medicalized transfer rarely required.